ABSTRACT This study examines the code words and euphemisms which protected Anglo-American communications intelligence (Comint) during the Cold War. It explains how the code word security system operated and identifies the main Comint code words and euphemisms in effect from
The great barrier to researching Cold War Anglo-American communications intelligence (Comint) has always been official secrecy. The American and British governments have only released a tiny proportion of the historic records held by their main Comint agencies, the National Security Agency (NSA) and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). NSA and GCHQ Comint also has exemptions from the American and British Freedom of Information Acts. The records of other bodies which handled Comint in the Cold War, like the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), are more open but Comint material is still often retained or heavily redacted before public release. Human sources are problematic as well because current and former government employees on both sides of the Atlantic can be prosecuted for disclosing Comint secrets. The secrecy barrier is not insuperable: recent major works by Matthew Aid and Richard Aldrich on the NSA and GCHQ respectively, have shown what can be achieved through meticulous research and careful analysis, but it does hamper progress and there remain big gaps in our knowledge, such as the extent of Anglo-American Comint on sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and communist China during the Cold War.
BRUSA which formed the basis of all national regulations for the security and dissemination of Comint. 4 Appendix B divided Comint into two security categories: Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence. Special Intelligence broadly consisted of Comint obtained from the decryption of encrypted foreign messages. Traffic Intelligence was Comint derived from means other than decoding or deciphering messages, such as the study of procedure signals, call signs, direction finding bearings and other externals of communications. These boundaries were not completely rigid, however, and the two types of Comint could sometimes cross over. Traffic Intelligence could be regarded as Special Intelligence if it disclosed successes in gaining intelligence from encrypted communications. Conversely, low level decrypted communications could sometimes be downgraded to the Traffic Intelligence category. Unencrypted, plain language messages would normally be categorized as Traffic Intelligence, although there were some exceptions. 5 After defining the terms, Appendix B set out general security and dissemination procedures for Anglo-American Comint. 6 It assigned the two categories of Comint security classifications and code words that would change over time. The most sensitive form of Comint, Special Intelligence, was classified as 'top secret' and given the code word 'Cream', which replaced the wartime high level Comint code word 'Ultra'. 7 The classification 'top secret' and the code word were to appear on every sheet of paper which contained Special Intelligence. 8 The same phrase was to be written on documents which revealed success, progress or processes in the production of Special Intelligence, even if the document did not contain actual intelligence. This rule extended to the 1946 edition of Appendix B which had the words 'TOP SECRET CREAM' written on the top right hand corner of every page. By 1948 the Special Intelligence code word had changed and a revised version of Appendix B was marked 'TOP SECRET GLINT'. 9 The Special Intelligence code words were themselves classified as 'top secret' and were not to be used in their code word sense in the presence of people who did not have Comint clearance. Traffic Intelligence was given a lower level of security -it was classified as 'secret' -and had its own series of code words. In 1946, the code word was 'Ivory' and the words 'SECRET IVORY' were to appear on every sheet of paper which contained or disclosed the existence of Traffic Intelligence.
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In 1953 Britain and the United States revised Appendix B and the code word categories, putting an even greater focus on the protection of Comint while at the same time relaxing certain elements of the system. 11 In the new edition of Appendix B the nomenclature changed as Special Intelligence was renamed 'Crypt Intelligence'. More fundamentally, the Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence security categories were replaced with a division of BRUSA Comint into three categories based upon the required level of protection. 12 In the new system the top level was Category III Comint, defined as Comint 'for which the protection of source or content is the overriding consideration and which must, therefore, be given the highest degree of security protection'. Into Category III went Crypt Intelligence, unless it was specifically assigned to the lower categories, Traffic Intelligence with call-signs or message headings encrypted in high security codes or ciphers, and one other type of Comint which has been redacted in the document. At the discretion of the American and British Comint authorities, other Traffic Intelligence could also be placed in this category. Category II Comint had less rigorous standards of security and was the default category for Traffic Intelligence. It also included Crypt Intelligence 'involving the solution of codes, ciphers and special systems of lower security'. Category I Comint had the least stringent security restrictions and consisted of low level Comint as agreed by the authorities. In addition to these definitions, the revised Appendix B offered some general criteria to help assign Comint to the right category. Officials would have to take into account the difficulty in intercepting the traffic or solving the codes and ciphers, the cryptographic sophistication of the country originating the traffic, the intelligence value of its content and the security grading given to the content by the originator country.
The code word system previously applied to Special Intelligence and Traffic Intelligence was transferred over to Category III and II Comint. The classification 'top secret' and a code word were to appear on every sheet of paper which contained or disclosed Category III Comint, including maps and charts. Category II material would carry the classification 'secret' and have a different code word. However, notes to the revised Appendix B did allow some exceptions to these rules. 13 14 The only innovation was that by the 1960s Category I Comint had been given its own code word, creating a system where there were three categories of UKUSA Comint, all identified and protected by a separate code word which changed over time. 15 As the Anglo-American Comint partnership expanded to include Australia, Canada and New Zealand, these countries used the same code words. The other field of signals intelligence (Sigint), electronic intelligence or the interception and processing of non-communications transmissions such as radar signals, was not covered by the BRUSA/UKUSA code word system.
The BRUSA/UKUSA code words and security procedures controlled and limited access to Comint. Ministers, officials and service personnel had to undergo special security checks, be 'indoctrinated' into the rules of Comint security and given specific clearances before they were authorized to see documents marked with the Comint code words. 16 Possession of a security clearance to see top secret documents did not on its own entitle a policymaker to view Special Intelligence or Category III Comint. In effect, the BRUSA/UKUSA code word system created a special compartment for Comint, separating it out from other types of secret and top secret information. Material in the Comint code word compartment was also subject to more stringent security measures. 17 In the State Department, documents containing special intelligence were not allowed to circulate freely in the building. Instead they were held in a double locked vault on the sixth floor and one other secure location. If a special intelligence document was required by a Comint indoctrinated State Department official, it would be brought to him or her by a security officer. Once the official had read the document, it would be immediately returned to the vault. 18 [State Department] Offices dealing with low priority countries benefited by exploiting the policymakers' compulsion to look at codeword material. The bearers of intercepts got favored treatment. The texts were placed between special covers, handled under lock and key, and hand delivered by special carriers. The latter enjoyed almost immediate access to the highest levels of the government, and these policymakers, in turn, often found NSA tidbits dramatic, entertaining, and juicy. 20 Following the end of the Cold War the UKUSA nations scrapped the main elements of the code word system. In 1999 the three current Comint code words were abolished along with the terms Comint Category I, II and III, although the material they covered still remained secret. 21 Comint would henceforth be controlled and protected in different ways. This change in procedure opened the way for the declassification of the previously secret Cold War Comint code words. A 2008 American National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) guide for reviewing and redacting declassified documents listed the following 'SIGINT product code words' which could be released: 23 Wise, who based his work on unattributable interviews with former American government officials, claimed that top secret special intelligence had been marked with the code words Dinar, Trine and Umbra. NSA documents released subsequently confirm his claims. A declassified internal history of the NSA referred to Dinar as a 'Category III COMINT codeword' and in a court affidavit in 1980 a senior NSA official revealed that Umbra was the 'codeword applicable to Category III (the highest category) COMINT'. 24 An internal NSA journal implied that Umbra was the replacement for Trine. 25 It can be deduced that eight of the other 'SIGINT product code words' on the NRO list were also BRUSA/UKUSA Special Intelligence or Category III code words. These eight words (Acorn, Canoe, Copse, Daunt, Eider, Froth, Glint and Suede) appear on American and British Comint material classified as 'top secret' and which at other times carried known Special Intelligence or Category III code words. Good examples of this are the approximately 3000 NSA Venona decrypts and analyses of 1940s Soviet intelligence messages which were painstakingly produced between 1946 and 1980. A Venona special analysis report from 1947 has the phrase 'TOP SECRET CREAM' on every page and Venona decrypts issued in the 1960s are marked 'top secret' with the code words Dinar, Trine or Umbra. 26 Venona documents and decrypts produced in the intervening period, from 1949 to 1960, still carry the classification 'top secret' but also one of the eight NRO code words used in the following chronological sequence: Glint, Copse, Acorn, Suede, Canoe, Froth, Eider and Daunt. 27 These eight code words cannot be specific to Venona ('Venona' itself was one of several special code words for the programme) because they also appear and follow the same sequence on other top secret Comint documents. The 
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Intelligence and National Security secret' and never 'secret' or 'confidential'. It seems safe to assume that they are Special Intelligence or Category III Comint code words. By tracking the appearance of the code words on the Venona documents, the GCHQ Soviet Bloc decrypts and CIA Korean War Freedom of Information Act releases, and by using other sources, it is possible to reconstruct the sequence of Special Intelligence and Category III Comint code words and the approximate time period for which they were in use:
Cream 43 The principle reason for persevering with existing code words, with the security risks that this entailed, was the cost and effort involved in replacing them. With Australia, Canada and New Zealand members of the Comint partnership and the NSA and GCHQ producing ever greater amounts of Comint material, changing code words became an expensive and laborious task. For each change over the UKUSA Comint agencies had to produce thousands of rubber stamps and sheets of pre-printed paper bearing the new code word and securely distribute them to all posts. 
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Intelligence and National Security the American public and forced a code word change. 45 In 1965 the New York Times Magazine published a photograph of Bundy talking to President Lyndon Johnson on the White House lawn. Bundy was holding a copy of the CIA Daily Bulletin on which was clearly visible the words 'TOP SECRET DINAR'. 46 An NSA internal history recalled that 'This produced numerous press references to ''a codeword so secret the very existence is classified''' and the UKUSA agencies were compelled to change the Category III code word to Trine, a process which cost around $250,000. 47 Unfortunately, Trine itself was compromised three years later in a much more dramatic fashion, when the North Koreans seized the American Sigint spy ship USS Pueblo and captured on board a considerable hoard of Comint material. 48 North Korea displayed on national television Sigint tasking documents from the Pueblo marked with Trine and other code words and later published pictures of them in a propaganda book. 49 Although the heads of the NSA were reluctant to change the code words at that time, believing that it 'would be more trouble, more expense, and cause more confusion that would be worthwhile from a security standpoint', Trine was replaced by Umbra in December 1968. 50 In spite of its own later exposure Umbra would remain the Category III code word for the rest of the Cold War.
Some of the other words on the NRO list can be identified as lower level Comint code words. Ivory was a Traffic Intelligence code word and Moray and Spoke were the Category I and II code words accompanying Umbra. 51 They were preceded by Larum and Savin from 1965 to 1968 and probably by Sabre and Kimbo in the first half of the 1960s. 52 Pearl, Pinup and Thumb were low level code words used in the Second World War, although Pearl also appeared on late 1940s GCHQ documents classified as 'secret' relating to Soviet Bloc communications. 53 The remaining 16 words in the NRO guide are not known but presumably some of them were Traffic Intelligence and Category I and II code words from 1947 to 1960.
Apart from these main BRUSA/UKUSA Comint code words, there were many others which further compartmentalized information and restricted access to it. 54 Probably the most important of these subsidiary code words was 'Gamma', which was introduced at some point between 1956 and 1967. 55 Gamma was used to give extra protection to particularly sensitive Comint such as intelligence on the Soviet Union, intercepts of South Vietnamese government communications and messages of American antiVietnam War activists.
56 Gamma documents carried the caveat 'GAMMA CONTROLLED ITEM' on the cover, first and title pages and Gamma markings on all the internal pages as well as the normal Category III Comint code words. 57 In the early 1970s Gamma contained approximately 20 subcompartments which protected particular operations, methods or sources, such as information about Soviet-Arab communications.
58 These subcompartments were designated by four-letter-long code words which always began with the letter 'G', producing such oddities as Gabe, Gant, Gart, Gilt, Gout, Grol, Gult, Gupy and Gyro. 'Gamma Gupy' was the term for Comint obtained by intercepting the car phone conversations of Soviet leaders in the 1960s and early 1970s while from autumn 1968, intercepts of South Vietnamese cable traffic were marked 'Gamma Gout'. 59 On documents the code words were compounded, so that a State Department intelligence note on the Soviet role in the May 1967 Middle East Crisis had the words 'TOP SECRET TRINE/GAMMA (GART-GROL) CONTROLLED' written at the top and bottom of every page. 60 Policymakers would need clearance for all of these separate code word compartments before they could see the document. 53 
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Perhaps because there were so many changing code words, 'code word' and 'codeword' themselves seem to have become generic terms for Comint. The warning 'This document contains code word material' was printed on the front of CIA reviews and memoranda containing Comint and it also appeared on the front page of a 1972 NSA 'Comint Report' on India. 61 In the 1970s the top secret edition of the CIA's regular Central Intelligence Bulletin carried the statement that it was published in both a Top Secret Codeword and a Secret edition. Recipients of the more tightly held Codeword version should not discuss it or its Codeword contents with recipients of the Secret edition. 62 Given that the top secret edition of the Bulletin included Comint, almost certainly 'Codeword' here referred to communications intelligence. 63 It is possible though, that 'code word' and 'codeword' did not always mean Comint. From the mid-1950s the United States had developed another code word control system for intelligence gathered by high level aerial reconnaissance and later satellites, using code words such as Talent and Keyhole. 64 'Code word' and 'codeword' might sometimes refer to these code words and imagery intelligence.
The BRUSA/UKUSA procedures created an interlocking system for controlling and referring to Comint and the combined markings and different terms can be seen on issues of the CIA's Current Intelligence Weekly Review. The review was published by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence every Friday and issued to American officials in Comint or nonComint versions. 65 A Comint version of the weekly review of 30 August 1956 had the security classification and the Category III Comint code word, 'TOP SECRET EIDER', printed on the top of its interior pages. 66 Its cover page was emblazoned with the customary phrase 'THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL', followed by the stern instructions that the document is to be seen only by US PERSONNEL especially indoctrinated and authorised to receive Special Intelligence information. The security of this document must be maintained in accordance with SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SECURITY REGULATIONS. No action may be taken by any person on the Special Intelligence presented herein, regardless of any advantage which may be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.
Editions of the Weekly Review from the late 1950s and 1960s had a similar format but substituted the phrase 'communications intelligence' for 'special intelligence' in the front page instructions. 67 The influence of the BRUSA/UKUSA security and dissemination system spread beyond these formal markings on documents. Indoctrinated American and British policymakers sometimes used the different control terms as euphemisms for Comint in their internal correspondence. Rather than write 'Comint' or 'Sigint' they wrote 'special intelligence', 'code word material' or the current high level Comint code word. Examples of this usage can be seen in British documents from the Suez War of 1956. In a minute to the JIC in November 1956 a British official explained how intelligence would be coordinated during the conflict with Egypt. He noted that the staff would 'check for the exclusion of codeword material from the daily report prepared . . . for circulation to the Cabinet'. 68 In another minute, an official described the early morning daily intelligence briefings in the War Room in Whitehall as being only for 'those officers who are cleared to receive Eider information'. 69 Despite the introduction of the term 'Crypt Intelligence' and the triple category system, the phrase 'special intelligence' seems to have been the euphemism most commonly used in correspondence. This practice may even have been an approved part of UKUSA security procedure, for the NRO review and redaction guide defined 'Special Intelligence' as 'the unclassified term which is used to identify COMINT in the unclassified environment'. 70 Understanding the BRUSA/UKUSA security system and identifying the various code words and euphemisms is important because they can help pierce some of the secrecy surrounding Comint. Although the Special Intelligence and Category III code words and Comint euphemisms were originally intended to protect and conceal intelligence, once their meanings are known they can signal the presence of Comint in a document and reveal information about it. They can indicate NSA and GCHQ Comint targets, show what intelligence the agencies were providing American and British policymakers and give clues to code breaking successes. Yet there are limits to using the code words in this way. In the past American government reviewers often redacted the high level Comint code words on documents prior to their public release; on CIA intelligence reports it is common to see the classification 'top secret' with the following word deleted. Indeed, reviewers sometimes overlooked a code word and inadvertently revealed what they were trying to hide. On a 106-page long CIA report about Soviet defence spending from 1955, a reviewer has carefully deleted the word following 'TOP SECRET' on top and bottom of every page, except for the top of page 23, where the tell-tale phrase 'TOP SECRET EIDER' can be seen.
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It should also be borne in mind that the Special Intelligence and Category III code words were not exclusively for intelligence derived from code breaking. The guidance in BRUSA Appendix B suggests that the high level code words were sometimes used for Comint based on traffic analysis and perhaps plain text and speech intercepts. They could also protect documents which contained information on Comint collection methods or the handling of Comint instead of actual Comint. There is an element of uncertainly as well, because parts of Appendix B relating to Special Intelligence and Category III Comint are redacted and procedures may have been amended after 1956. Nonetheless, if a specific intelligence report was marked with a Special Intelligence or Category III code word it does indicate that some of the information in that report came from Comint. Furthermore, it will have come from Comint requiring the highest degree of security protection. On most occasions this would be decrypted or deciphered communications rather than traffic analysis or plain text.
Despite the best efforts of the reviewers, high level code words and Comint euphemisms appear on declassified American intelligence reports relating to many different countries during the Cold War: Bolivia, China, the Congo, France, Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan, Indonesia, Laos, North China to demonstrate how code words and euphemisms can be used with other evidence to pick out NSA and GCHQ intelligence targets and uncover Comint. For simplicity's sake, the article will treat the NSA as being the producer of Comint in American intelligence reports but because of the BRUSA/UKUSA cooperation arrangements, GCHQ may actually have been the source for some countries in Africa and Asia. For example, Comint on China in a CIA memorandum might have originated in a GCHQ intercept from Britain's listening post in Hong Kong. Equally, NSA intercepts, solutions to foreign codes and decrypted Comint would have been shared with GCHQ.
Firstly, Category III code words and Comint euphemisms on documents can identify little known targets of the NSA, such as the Congo in the 1960s. After independence in 1960, the Congo went through a prolonged and complex crisis, with multiple secessions, civil war, military coups and intervention by Belgian and United Nations' troops. Amidst the chaos and instability, the United States was determined to deny the USSR a foothold in the Congo and it opposed Soviet-leaning Congolese leaders, such as Patrice Lumumba, the prime minister, and Antoine Gizenga, Lumumba's deputy, who later established a rebel regime based in the city of Stanleyville.
It is clear from code word documents that the NSA supplied Comint on the Congo to American policymakers. On 11 August 1960 the Congo featured in a 'Synopsis of Intelligence Material Reported to the President' written by John Eisenhower, Assistant Staff Secretary to President Dwight Eisenhower. 73 The short synopsis carried the classification 'TOP SECRET DAUNT', marking it out as containing Category III Comint, but frustratingly the text on the Congo has been completely redacted. The following month, the CIA sent the Director for Intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff an analysis of Soviet Bloc aid to the Congo that was also stamped with the words 'TOP SECRET DAUNT'. 74 The paper, which is partially redacted, gave details of Bloc supply flights into the Congo and the numbers of Bloc personnel in the country. Other evidence points to the NSA being able to read the communications of Gizenga's rebel government in Stanleyville. Gizenga was in contact with the President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, who had recognized the Stanleyville regime and secretly agreed to funnel it Soviet supplied arms. 75 The Comint edition of the CIA's Current Intelligence Weekly Review reported on 25 May 1961 that:
SECRET TRINE', indicating that the report was high level Comint. The report has been partially redacted to hide the author's identity but the phrasing of the text and the point of view of the author suggests that it was written by a South Vietnamese rather than an American participant at the meeting. Taking the Comint code word into account, it appears to be an intercepted South Vietnamese message (presumably this was before these intercepts were given the additional Gamma Gout code words).
Finally, Category III code words and Comint euphemisms can offer insights into Anglo-American Comint on China, demonstrating the sort of intelligence the NSA and GCHQ could produce on this primary Cold War target. Close reading of an American document suggests that during the 1960s the NSA was able to read some Chinese military traffic. A CIA intelligence memorandum from 1965 on Taiwan's capability to attack the mainland included a map of the communist order of battle in southern China. 89 The map gave the locations of Chinese army divisions, border defence divisions and air and naval bases and provided figures for the local and national strength of the Chinese army, navy and air force. It was marked 'TOP SECRET DINAR', indicating that some of the information on the map had come from Comint (by contrast, an accompanying map of the Taiwanese order of battle was only classified 'secret' and had no Comint code word). This implies that the CIA was using intercepted Chinese military communications, along with other forms of intelligence, to work out the location, organization and strength of the Chinese armed forces. Some of the Comint might have come from plain text and speech transmissions and traffic analysis but it is possible that the NSA could solve at least low level Chinese military codes.
Comint markers and other evidence show that the NSA could use this intelligence to track the movements of the Chinese military. For example, in June 1962 Beijing secretly sent six infantry divisions and one artillery division into Fukien province, raising the battle strength opposite Taiwan from 194,000 to 311,000 men. 90 Although the Chinese government initially made this move without any publicity, Washington was aware of it, partly through Comint. From 1962 until 1966, the noted Asia scholar Allen Whiting was head of Far East division of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and he was responsible for collating and assessing information on the Chinese build up. 91 Whiting had access to intelligence from the NSA and he subsequently wrote that American 'signal intelligence [was] monitoring [Chinese] headquarters deployment in advance of the total force'. 92 Roger Hilsman, the Director of the INR, assessed the intentions behind the deployment by examining 'the limited collateral evidence and some aspects of the special intelligence on Chinese Communist activities in the East China area'. 93 Another map in the CIA's 1965 memorandum plotted the build up of Chinese forces in Fukien in 1962 and was also classified 'TOP SECRET DINAR', betraying the presence of Category III Comint.
In a similar way, the NSA eavesdropped on China's military response to the escalating war in Vietnam. Whiting described how after the Tonkin Gulf crisis in August 1964, the United States followed Chinese deployments through the use of 'signals intelligence, drone reconnaissance planes and Chinese Nationalist piloted U-2s'. 94 American 'communication intercepts monitored the movement of [Chinese] air units from one point to another'. 95 Code word material supports Whiting's claims. In February 1965 the CIA produced a special report on China's post Tonkin Gulf military deployments. 96 The report has been partially redacted but the phrase 'TOP SECRET DINAR' is still visible on one section entitled 'Military Preparations in Communist China'. This section stated that since August 1964, Beijing had transferred the headquarters of its South Sea Fleet to Fort Bayard (now Zhanjiang), moved the 7th Air Army nearer the Vietnamese border area and established Sino-Vietnamese air warning liaison facilities. The Chinese air force had boosted its strength in southern China, building new airfields, improving existing ones and bringing in an extra 200 fighter planes as reinforcements. The CIA paper also reported a secret meeting between Chinese and North Vietnamese military leaders in June 1964. Books based on Chinese sources have since confirmed that this meeting and many of the military deployments did in fact take place. 97 These are only a few examples but they illustrate how Comint code words and euphemisms can help interpret documents and extract more information about Anglo-American Comint. During the Cold War the BRUSA/UKUSA states developed a comprehensive system to secure and manage Comint. The security categories and code words were an integral part of the system, with the code words always meant to mark out the documents that contained
